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 Page, Arizona is home to the Navajo Generating Station, a coal-fired power plant 
that provides the power for the Central Arizona Project (CAP) and other consumers of 
electricity in the Southwest. Though the plant is not owned by the Navajo (Diné) tribe, 
the Navajo “subsidize” the plant with reservation coal, water, and labor, externalizing the 
costs of the generating station’s production processes onto Navajo lands and bodies. This 
thesis attempts to trace the historical-geographic genesis of the plant, situating it within 
broader contexts of power dynamics in Northern Arizona that govern the spatialities of 
the coal industry via the production of nature, the construction of wilderness, and the 
colonization of the Diné. According to one Diné activist, the coal industry has made the 
Diné economically dependent on their own cultural destruction (Rowe 2013). I point to 
the role of United States Federal policy and resource management sectors such as the 
Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service in the creation of this condition of 
resource dependency, the siting of the NGS on Navajo lands just a few miles outside of 
Page, and ultimately the internal colonization of the Diné. How did Page, Arizona (writ-
large) come to be the site of the state’s largest and dirtiest coal-fired plant, the Navajo 
Generating Station, and what does this illustrate about the relationship between nature, 
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Chapter 1 
National Natures over Native Spaces: “America’s holiest shrines” and its “sacrifice 
zones”  
 
 Between the Rio Grande and Colorado River of the American Southwest lies the 
largest—and perhaps driest—stretch of Native American Reservation lands in the United 
States. At points the land is so flat and uninterrupted that you can travel many miles 
without noticing any change in the landscape; you can feel—speeding along Interstate 40 
at sixty miles an hour, or watching the sparse vegetation blur with the livestock fences 
from the tracks of the transcontinental railroad—as though you are not moving at all. On 
the high desert plain of the Colorado Plateau, a land of very little rain, the Hopi and 
Navajo (Diné) Nations cover nearly 80,000 square kilometres, bordering western New 
Mexico, southern Utah and the northeastern rim of the Grand Canyon. The Colorado 
River, originating in present-day Rocky Mountain National Park north of Denver and 
flowing west, spans a 1,440-mile trail through the Southwest, joining the Green River just 
south of Moab, Utah and traveling south through Arizona, bordering Nevada and 
California and finally reaching a northern delta at the Sea of Cortés in Mexico (Dickey 
2011, 9). This river is the lifeline of the Southwest—including Arizona, New Mexico, 
Southern Utah and Colorado, Nevada and California—where the war over water has 
created a political atmosphere and a material reality that ignores the demands of the 
region’s Native peoples.  
 The movement of water, electrical power, coal, people, and trucked goods across 
the wide spaces of the Southwest requires massive infrastructure: dams, power plants, 
canals, roads, train tracks, and power lines. The distances that must be overcome are 
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remarkable, and transportation infrastructure consumes enormous amounts of energy, 
time and money. Having grown up in New Mexico, I have childhood memories of family 
visits to Phoenix and road trips to the Grand Canyon, during which we drove for 
seemingly endless amounts of time on hot black asphalt and dirt roads across the desert. 
More recently, in January of 2014, I took the train home from California to New Mexico. 
The railroad crosses northern Arizona just south of the Navajo and Hopi reservation 
borders, pulling into Gallup, New Mexico on its way to Albuquerque. After passing 
through Flagstaff at five o’clock in the morning, I sat in the observation car and watched 
the sun rise outside Winslow, Arizona. This time, I saw the landscape anew. The hazy 
orange sky rested on the red rim of the earth, punctured by the sharp edges of distant 
mesas.  
 From the window of the observation car, what some have characterized as an  
ecocide,1 due to the massive effects of coal and uranium mining taking place on the 
Navajo and Hopi reservations, was not immediately evident. The haze of pollution in the 
morning sky amplified the orange color of the sunrise, and the vast, dark plains and 
jagged volcanic intrusions felt more ‘wild’ and unknown to me than any crowded 
national park. 
 Next door, this same haze settles over the Grand Canyon. It originates from a 
coal-fired power plant in Page, Arizona. Located on Navajo land twelve miles to the 
northeast of the Grand Canyon National Park border, the plant (Navajo Generating 
Station, or NGS) burns 8 million tons of coal each year to produce 2,250 megawatts of 
electricity. Extra-high voltage power lines carry this electricity to a variety of users in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Grinde, D.A. and Johansen, B.E. (1995). Ecocide of Native America: Environmental 
Destruction of Indian Lands and Peoples. Santa Fe: Clear Light Publishers.	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Southwest, including the Central Arizona Project, a canal that carries water from the 
Colorado River to Tucson and Phoenix. But the plant produces much more than 
electricity: each year its smokestacks emit 34,000 tons of nitrogen oxides into the Four 
Corners sky, plus more than 500 pounds of mercury and more than 15 million tons of 
carbon dioxide (Friederici 2015). It also requires massive inputs of water, in a region 
where struggles over this precious resource have long shaped the landscape.  
 But while the scale and severity of human and environmental degradation the 
NGS produces is striking, what is remarkable about the plant is its location. The NGS, 
established following the Grand Canyon Dam controversy of 1944 to 1968 during a coal 
mining boom on the Navajo reservation, lies in a border zone. It is located at the edge of 
the Navajo Nation next to several large United States national wilderness areas, such as 
Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, in the small 
tourist town of Page. Page is a zone of overlapping spaces—an “American,” “developed” 
one next to an “underdeveloped” Native one and preserved, “pristine” ones as well; it is a 
border zone where two different socially constructed “natures” collide. 
 As a recent article in the National Parks Conservation Association magazine 
illustrates, the coal-fired power plant is quite literally “generating controversy” (Rowe 
2013). I am specifically interested in how the NGS came to Page and what its relationship 
is to the place it sits in and to those around it (specifically the Grand Canyon and the 
Navajo Nation). Thus, how did Page, Arizona (writ-large) come to be the site of the 
state’s largest and dirtiest coal-fired plant, the Navajo Generating Station?  
 Processes of colonialism have produced and shaped the landscape of northern 
Arizona on the Colorado Plateau, within which the NGS is embedded. Focusing 
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specifically on the NGS allows me to extrapolate a broader understanding of how the 
politics of nature, space and colonialism are intertwined. Therefore my broader question 
is: What can the establishment of the NGS illustrate about the relationship between 
nature, space, and colonialism? I attempt to reconceptualize each of these ideas in order 
to arrive at more liberatory understandings of them.  
 The National Park system and the Reservation system, both of which have 
facilitated the dispossession of Native peoples through removal, relocation and genocidal 
violence, are colonial policies which have helped to construct wilderness spaces as 
“pristine natures” which must be carefully managed and kept, and Native reservations as 
spaces where “nature” should be commodified and exploited. In the case of the Navajo 
Nation, this has resulted in the material and symbolic sacrifice of Navajo bodies, lands, 
water and air through processes of commodification, exploitation and pollution. Dinétah 
(Navajoland) is therefore a colonized space, an internal colony of the United States.  
 While other scholars have written on the Grand Canyon Dam controversy (Sonia 
Dickey, Byron Pearson), natural resource development on Native American lands 
(Churchill 2002; Grinde and Johansen 1995; Hooks and Smith 2004; Ishiyama 2003; 
Miller 2012 and many others), and the production and construction of nature (Neil Smith, 
William Cronon, and Erik Swyngedow are some that have influenced my thinking on 
this), I uncover the ways in which these phenomenon have co-created both the town of 
Page and the Navajo Generating Station. According to Smith, the production of nature 
refers to processes of conversion, transformation and metabolisation of “first nature” into 
an altered “second nature” (1984). Cronon, on the other hand, does not use the language 
of “production,” but “construction” to refer to the social processes which have created 
 
	   9	  
and consecrated “wild, pristine nature” as something untouched and uninhabited by 
humans when in fact the notion of wilderness is socially constructed (Cronon 1996).  
 There are several key conceptual commitments which help to lay the groundwork 
for further reconceptualizations and engage with critical theories in geography of nature, 
space and colonialism. With scholars like Erik Swyngedow, William Cronon, Mark 
David Spence, I argue that the nature/society binary is a false and constructed divide: 
nature and society are in fact deeply intertwined. I use Swyngedouw’s term “socionature” 
to connote that social processes and ecological or natural processes do not operate 
separately; these processes intricately transform “pre-existing configurations” in the 
world that are themselves inherently natural and social to produce socionature (1999, 
445). Wilderness, contrary to what most environmentalists would argue, “is not a pristine 
sanctuary where the last remnant of an untouched, endangered, but still transcendent 
nature” can be experienced, but rather a product of civilization, purified by the removal 
of American Indians and perpetuated by the myth of the frontier2 (Cronon 1996, 7).  
 Page, the Grand Canyon and the Navajo Nation are each incarnations of 
socionature transformed by the same social and ecological processes in different ways. 
These processes are both temporal and spatial, continuing to (re)produce place over time. 
I conceptualize ‘place’ in Doreen Massey’s “progressive sense,” in that places are 
proccessual, unbounded, and full of “internal differences and conflicts”: they do not have 
single, unique identities (1991, 67). Instead of thinking of the NGS, Page, the Grand 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  As Cronon (1996) states, “[t]he movement to set aside national parks and wilderness areas followed hard 
on the heels of the final Indian wars, in which the prior human inhabitants of these areas were rounded up 
and moved onto reservations. The myth of the wilderness as ‘virgin,’ uninhabited land had always been 
especially cruel when seen from the perspective of the Indians who had once called that land home. Now 
they were forced to move elsewhere, with the result that tourists could safely enjoy the illusion that they 
were seeing their nation in its pristine, original state, in the new morning of God's own creation…The 
removal of Indians to create an ‘uninhabited wilderness’—uninhabited as never before in the human history 
of the place—reminds us just how constructed the American wilderness really is” (15-16). 
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Canyon and the Navajo Nation as areas with boundaries, I think of them as “articulated 
moments in networks of [socionatural] relations and understandings” (Massey 1991, 67). 
Furthermore, these networks of relations implicate expressions of power. For example, 
the process of “time-space compression”3 affects different social groups and individuals 
differently (Massey 1991). This is what Massey calls “power-geometry”: she argues that 
different social groups and individuals are located in distinct ways to mobility, the flow 
of capital, and power relations more broadly (ibid). Thus, power-geometry positions the 
highly mobile Grand Canyon tourist differently than it positions the Diné sheepherder or 
Navajo Generating Station employee with respect to mobility and flows of capital. 
 As opposed to the environmentalist/wilderness tourist—a highly mobile American 
citizen—the Diné are a relatively immobile people, constrained by processes of 
colonization (both historical and contemporary). As a group that has been historically 
subordinated in its own homeland within the boundaries of a larger state dominated by a 
different people, the Navajo Nation is an “internal colony” (Chávez 2011). The theory of 
internal colonization seeks to explain the broader relationships of ethnic inequality across 
history and geography by suggesting that the subordinate status of internally colonized 
peoples usually results from the combination of military conquest followed by political, 
economic, cultural, and complete social and even psychological subordination (Chávez 
2011).  
 The status of the Navajo Nation as an internal colony, and thus a space of 
sacrifice, helps further explain the siting of the Navajo Generating Station on Diné lands 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In geography, the idea of “time-space compression” describes a new phase of what Karl Marx observed 
as the “annihilation of space by time,” in the sense that modernization has collapsed both space and time by 
disrupting horizons, spatial barriers, and so forth with the “speed-up” of travel and communication. See 
Harvey (1989) and Massey (1991).	  
 
	   11	  
just outside Page as both an act of environmental racism and internal colonization. That 
communities of low-income people of color (and some whites) are disproportionately 
exposed to toxic chemicals, heavy industry and pollution has been widely observed in the 
environmental racism and environmental justice discourses (e.g. Churchill 2002; Grinde 
and Johansen 1995; Ishiyama 2003; Kuletz 1998; Lerner 2010; Pulido 2000; Ray 2009). 
In the case of Native American tribes whose tribal councils often act in favor of resource 
development, however, this phenomenon can be framed as an issue of tribal sovereignty: 
Native American tribes should be able to make the decision to house a coal-fired power 
plant or a toxic waste disposal site, if they want to, especially since “poverty-stricken” 
tribes such as the Navajo desperately need to create economic opportunities for their 
people. Furthermore, some argue that environmentalist racism discourses, which seek to 
provide structural explanations for disproportionate exposure, effectively reduce Native 
American agency by insinuating that tribes have no choice in the matter of their own 
socionatural destruction, and that the decision to house is ultimately an expression of 
sovereignty (Ishiyama 2003). However, when it comes to this rhetoric it is it is important 
to distinguish between an indigenous nation’s tribal council and the people of the 
reservation, who have diverse opinions about their Tribal Council’s natural resource 
decisions that remain largely unheard through the overwhelming din of development.  
 While there are diverse attitudes within the Navajo Nation towards the NGS, 
since it is a (growing) source of revenue for the tribe4 (but also a source of social, medical 
and environmental ills on the reservation), and these attitudes are both important and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  A new lease between the plant’s operators and the Navajo Nation signed in 2013 will increase the annual 
payments to the tribe from $600,000 per year to $42 million a year (Friederici 2015). 
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informative, my analysis of the siting of the plant attempts to understand the spatial, 
socionatural processes which have created a landscape embedded with inequality.  
I seek to understand how the spatial, historical colonial processes that have created the 
conditions of the Navajo Nation’s economic dependency on extractive industries and 
their resulting environmental impact as well as the need for employment render 
“indigenous peoples as economic hostages” (Smith 2007, 3).  
 The conceptual frameworks outlined above regarding socionature, space, and 
colonialism contribute key insights to the establishment of the Navajo Generating Station 
in Page and its relationship to the socionatural, political and economic landscape of the 
Southwest. The Navajo Generating Station’s proximity to federally-designated 
wilderness areas—“America’s holiest shrines”—and Native American reservations 
presents an opportunity for insight into the different ways in which various actors 
produce and consume “nature.” To some, such as the National Parks Service and 
American conservationists, “nature” is a pristine, unpeopled wilderness that should be 
carefully managed and protected, reserved for tourism. But next door, just across the park 
border, lies a different kind of  “nature”—a reservation nature—which can be 
commodified, polluted, and sacrificed in order to modernize landscapes such as Phoenix 
and Tucson. As Oglala Sioux spiritual leader Black Elk notes, a “dual ‘island’ system of 
nature preserves and Indian reservations” has been created in the United States, where 
“wilderness preservation goes hand in hand with native dispossession” (Spence 1999, 3). 
This dispossession and the legacy of (ongoing) colonization of Native America has 
rendered tribes such as the Navajo, who are nominally sovereign, as internal colonies 
within the United States (Chàvez 2011). As a colonized people, the Diné endure the 
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effects of massive coal and uranium mining without benefiting from the power and 
modern amenities they make possible in other places. The exploitation of nature on the 
reservation renders it a “national sacrifice zone” (Churchill 2002; Hooks & Smith 2004; 
Kuletz 1998; Lerner 2010; Ishiyama 2003).  
 In the next chapter, I explain the role of the Grand Canyon Dam controversy in 
the establishment of the NGS. The controversy, which took place over the proposal to 
construct two hydroelectric dams in the Grand Canyon, is at its core a controversy over 
water. Water is one form of ‘socionature’1 which is both a necessity for the wellbeing of 
people, the development of urban spaces and agriculture as well as a threat to “pristine” 
places when dams threaten to flood “postcard landscapes” such as the Grand Canyon and 
Glen Canyon. The Grand Canyon dams were supposed to provide the power needed to 
construct the Central Arizona Project, a canal which would carry water from the 
Colorado River to Phoenix and Tucson. Opposition to the dams resulted in the 
establishment of the Navajo Generation Station as the alternative source of power for the 
canal. However, I illuminate how the effort to save the Grand Canyon (and California’s 
water supply), contributed to the sacrifice of Navajo land, air, water and people.  
 Chapter three continues this discussion by turning to Page, where the generating 
station is located. Page is a border zone, a place of multiple identities and formations, 
where spaces of pristine, national “nature” intersect with spaces of Native, or indigenous 
“nature.” Among other factors, Page’s history as a construction town for the Glen 
Canyon dam in the 1950s and 60s made it an ideal location for the Navajo Generating 
Station. While the NGS draws on the resources of Page and the Navajo Reservation, it 
also provides them with employment and revenue (“development”). While benefiting 
 
	   14	  
from these resources, the plant also threatens the “pristine” quality of nearby wilderness 
areas.  
 Finally, I move slightly east to focus on the Navajo Reservation, where an 
internally colonized people struggle to navigate a landscape of genocide, dispossession, 
drought, and pollution. Federal policies have time and again exploited Navajo resources, 
channelling Navajo assets for power and profit. The history of the Diné is important here 
in revealing how the bounding of the Navajo, and relatedly, the bounding of nature, have 
created spaces of sacrifice.  
 Reconfiguring our notions of nature and wilderness uncovers why an 
environmentalism which seeks to preserve a constructed, aesthetic nature turns a blind 
eye as the ecocide of Native America continues, while failing to see wilderness tourism 
for what it is—the consumption of nature for the enjoyment of the civilized tourist. I  
start by excavating, in a historical and political sense, the details of the Grand Canyon 
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Chapter 2 
 Watering the West: (Re)Telling the History of a (Nearly) Damned Nation  
 
 On a warm January morning, my dad and I drive up U.S. Highway 89 on the way 
to Page, Arizona. Though it is the middle of winter, the windows of my dad’s 1983 
Volvo station wagon are cracked to let in the late morning air. Along the highway I 
notice a decrepit-looking water tank which reads “Water is life” in colourful spray paint. 
The tagged tank pops against the sandstone mesas, light blue sky and EHV (extra high 
voltage) power lines in the background. We are about a half hour’s drive from Page, and 
these power lines are transmitting electricity generated at the NGS.  
 The Navajo Generating Station, in the process of transforming water, coal, and 
labor into electrical power, also transforms Navajo landscapes and bodies. Jihan Gearon, 
executive director of the Black Mesa Water Coalition (an organization dedicated to issues 
of water depletion, natural resource exploitation and health promotion within Navajo and 
Hopi communities), points out that the Navajo “subsidize” the cities of Phoenix, 
Scottsdale, Tucson, Casa Grande by giving away their water, their coal, and their 
livelihoods to NGS (Rowe 2013). Although the Navajo do not own the Navajo 
Generating Station (it is jointly owned by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, Salt 
River Project, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Arizona Public Service 
Company, Nevada Energy, and Tucson Electrical Power), Navajo assets fuel the plant. 
“We give so many things for free to the NGS,” says Gearon, such as the land where the 
plant sits (Rowe 2013).  
It sits on the Navajo reservation because we gave them a free land lease. The 
electricity lines that run across the Navajo nation, the train tracks that carry the 
coal, we’ve given them all of those right of ways for basically nothing. And that’s 
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why, you know, the cities of Phoenix, the cities of Scottsdale, the city of Tucson, 
the city of Casa Grande, is able to have very cheap electricity and very cheap 
water. They pay almost nothing for the water. And that’s because we’re 
subsidizing it up here on our end. (Gearon quoted in Rowe 2013) 
  
 In order to understand how the Navajo become entrenched in this relationship 
with the Navajo Generating Station, I turn to the plant’s genesis and unique history, 
which differs from other coal plants on the reservation. It is critically tied to the history of 
water reclamation in the American West. The NGS provides 90 percent of the power for 
the Central Arizona Project, used to pump water across 336 miles of canal up to Phoenix 
and Tucson. The CAP was originally slated to get its power from two hydroelectric dams 
in the Grand Canyon, but when the dams proved to be too problematic, CAP proponents 
turned to Navajo coal to provide the power they needed. For the purposes of this chapter, 
I am interested in the role of water in creating the NGS. How has water—and the 
discourses that give it meaning—given way, both materially and discursively, to the 
NGS? When the proposed Bridge and Marble Canyon dams threatened to flood sections 
of the Grand Canyon, water was constructed as threat to the “pristine” nature of the 
Grand Canyon—but water is also a commodity and a necessity for the development of 
urban spaces and agriculture. In other words, “water is life.” In various contexts and 
settings, water holds different meaning and value. Throughout the chapter I develop the 
historical context for water reclamation projects like the CAP in the West, the politicized 
story about water which underlies the Grand Canyon Dam controversy and the role of the 
Hualapai and Navajo Nations, and the establishment of the NGS with the passage of the 
CAP legislation (The Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968), as an ‘alternative’ to 
the Grand Canyon dams. 
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 First of all, the demand for water in burgeoning urban parts of Arizona and for 
agricultural use led to the demand for a Central Arizona Project, which (as I have 
mentioned) is causally linked to the NGS. Without the infrastructure to tap, dam and 
channel rivers or pump groundwater from aquifers, cities, agriculture, and other 
industries would not be able to exist in the region. The Colorado River is a major water 
source for many southwestern states (even California, which isn’t part of its watershed 
basin). Dozens of hydroelectric dams and hundreds of miles of canals collect and divert 
water into southern California, Nevada and southern Arizona. I argue that as agriculture 
and urbanization spread across the arid American West, the development of infrastructure 
and engineering projects to water farms and cities facilitated the production of the 
Southwest water landscape, or “waterscape.” 5  
The notion of the waterscape is important because it facilitates thinking about the 
ways in which political-ecological processes and practices surrounding water shape the 
landscape. These processes and practices constitute the socionatural transformations that 
historically and geographically produce the landscape; water and the waterscape are 
critical elements of the landscape. The process commonly referred to as modernization, 
for all its obscurity, “contradictions and tensions,” plays a role in the transformation of 
the landscape (Swyngedouw 1999, 445). The engineering of infrastructure to allow for 
transportation and distribution of water—and relatedly, power—produces a landscape in 
which flows and interconnections between places and people follow networks of 
“privilege and exclusion, of participation and marginality” (Swyngedouw 1999, 446).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Swyngedouw (1999) examines the production of the Spanish “waterscape” in the early 20th century, 
arguing that the modernization of Spain through hydrological engineering was both a political and 
geographic project engaged in the production of socionature. A similar process occurs in the American 
Southwest.  
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In defining avenues of flow and in claiming, quantifying and distributing water—
in other words, in commodifying it—these social spaces of privilege and exclusion 
emerge. The commodification of water makes it possible to transport it across great 
distances in order to water farms and cities, and thus transform the landscape. While 
landscape transformation is a collective and diffuse project, there are specific actors at 
play that we can identify as sources of socionatural transformation. The Bureau of 
Reclamation is the primary producer of water as a commodity in the West and the muscle 
behind hydrological engineering projects along the Rio Colorado. Politicians, 
environmental groups, and tribal governments play important roles as well. Each of these 
actors—though I have by no means identified all—have had a hand in the establishment 
of the Navajo Generating Station. The NGS is involved in the transformation of the 
landscape for reasons I have already touched on. The NGS, because it is so closely tied to 
water through its position as the power source for the CAP canal and the consumer of a 
large portion of the Navajo Nation’s Colorado River water apportionment, has a unique 
role in both the coal and water industries. I refer to water as an industry because although 
water reclamation in the American West professes to benefit the public and facilitate 
modernization for all, water is treated as a commodity and becomes entangled in the 
process of the production of nature. Water is not only a source of livelihood but a source 
of profit—a commodity.  
 The early 20th century marked the dawn of water reclamation in the West. 
Reclamation, generally defined as the process of rendering marginally productive land 
resources more valuable to a broader set of users (Schroeder 1997, 487), involves the 
implementation of specific programs which facilitate this “re-claiming.” The U.S. Bureau 
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of Reclamation, as an agency within the Department of the Interior specifically dedicated 
to managing water in the West, “proclaims its dedication to ‘protecting the environment’ 
as well as to delivering water and power” (Pisani 2003, 392). Yet as the largest wholesale 
water supplier and the second largest producer of hydroelectric power in the United 
States,6 the agency is primarily involved in the production (the commodification), not the 
protection, of the environment.  
 Hydrologic infrastructure is a key tool in the production process. Following the 
end of the Civil War in the United States and the depression of the 1890s, at a time when 
the cultural psyche of America was focused on westward expansion and growth, federal 
reclamation facilitated the construction of over 100 dams, and more than 1,300 of miles 
of canals, ditches and tunnels (Pisani 2003). This reflected the desires of, among others, 
Western explorer and river-runner John Wesley Powell who dreamt of an “irrigated 
agrarian culture in the arid West,” where homesteaders, farmers and water infrastructure 
would help to vitalize the desert (Loeffler and Loeffler 2012:11). In the U.S. West, where 
land was plentiful and cheap, agriculture would help fuel a rapidly expanding and 
prosperous country—but the land was dry, and irrigation would be necessary to work the 
land.  
 Powell, while interested in promoting agriculture and access to water for 
irrigation in the West, foresaw the environmental problems that would arise with the 
allocation and transportation of water from western rivers outside of their watershed 
basins, causing rapid depletion of aquifers and rivers. He thus advocated for a system of 
local governances, or what he called “commonwealths” in the West that would only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  United States Bureau of Reclamation	  (usbr.gov).	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control the water within their watershed county, and only for uses within their designated 
watershed area (Loeffler and Loeffler 2012). Though Powell presented his plan before 
the Select Committee on Irrigation of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1890, 
Congress never approved it (Loeffler and Loeffler 2012). Instead, Reclamation’s 
unbridled irrigation and water storage projects began to stop up and divert rivers in the 
Southwest, carrying large quantities of water across great distances via canals and 
aqueducts without concern for the ecological consequences.  
 Since the early 1900s, as settlement boomed in the Southwest, Arizona had been 
thirsting for infrastructure projects that would help water their fields and growing 
population centers. The first of such projects, the Salt River Project, sought to control the 
unpredictable flow of the Salt River near Phoenix and continued to expand over many 
decades to create an intricate system of dams, canals, and power generating stations. The 
project at first included the construction of the Roosevelt Dam at the confluence of Tonto 
Creek and the Salt River, creating Theodore Roosevelt Lake, and three other dams and 
reservoirs on the Salt River. By the time the last of these dams was completed in 1930, 
the project had already expanded to the smaller Verde River, where four more dams were 
constructed. However, in the middle of the 20th century, Arizona water interests sought to 
tap into the much larger flow of the Colorado River, which cuts across the northwestern 
portion of the state, hundreds of miles from central Arizona. The state of Arizona thus 
devised plans for a Central Arizona Project to carry water from the Colorado down into 
the south-central portion of the state, allowing Arizona to make use of their legally 
designated allocation from the Colorado River.  
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 Arizona senator Carl Hayden first proposed plans for a Central Arizona Project in 
the 1940s, but California’s large congressional delegation blocked the bill in the House in 
1950 and 1951. While there was a powerful interest within Arizona for a Central Arizona 
Project, California presented a strong opposition because of the implications of the 
project for its own usage of the Colorado (Pearson 1998, 2000, 2002). Arizona and 
California had long fought over their respective allocations from the Colorado—
California had always received the lion’s share of the river, even though most of the state 
lies outside its watershed basin. California’s congressmen objected to the CAP because 
further storage and diversion of water from upstream of reservoirs that collect water for 
California’s aqueducts (as far north on the Colorado as Lake Mead) would reduce the 
flow of the river into those reservoirs, competing with its water supply from the Colorado 
River (Pearson 1998, 8).  
 Until Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall came into office in 1960, California 
politicians had successfully stifled the plans for the CAP, but ultimately were unable to 
stop the project—only the dams which would power it. For over half a century before the 
CAP legislation passed, California and Arizona had been embroiled in legal battles over 
the allocation of the Colorado River. This began in 1922, when Arizona refused to ratify 
the Colorado River Compact, a piece of legislation drawn under the leadership of 
secretary of commerce Herbert Hoover in Santa Fe, NM between the Colorado River 
basin states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Mexico) 
(Gelt 1997).7 The compact split the river into upper and lower basins, allocating 7.5 
million acre-feet (maf) to each basin for the basin-states to share (7.5 maf for Colorado, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See appendix for a copy of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (usbr.gov). 
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Utah and New Mexico collectively and 7.5 maf for Nevada, Arizona and California 
collectively). But the compact did not specify the amounts that each individual state 
would receive, which soon became a problem. Arizona, seeking to limit California’s 
allocation and thus protect its own, took California to the Supreme Court in 1931. The 
case, Arizona v. California, has been relitigated many times since then8. In the 1940s, 
Arizona began to develop plans for a Central Arizona Project. But until Arizona could 
secure a specified allocation from the Colorado and make sure that California’s 
consumption would be capped, plans for the CAP could not go forward. Plans were 
formalized in 1960s with the 1963 ruling of Arizona v. California, in which the court 
decided that of the 7.5 maf purportedly belonging to the Colorado River’s lower basin 
states, California would receive 4.4 maf per year, Arizona would receive 2.8 maf, and 
Nevada 300,000 af per year; Arizona and California would divide any ‘surplus’ flow 
evenly9. 
 Following the 1963 Supreme Court ruling, Senator Hayden and new Interior 
Secretary Udall tried to push the CAP legislation through Congress by including it in a 
more extensive water reclamation plan that included benefits for California (Pearson 
2000, 2002). With his Pacific Southwest Water Plan Udall hoped to “secure California’s 
support with the promise of water importation from the Colombia River,” and then 
shepherd the CAP through congress along with it (Pearson 2000: 304). But the Pacific 
Southwest Water Plan, which also included the high Bridge and Marble Canyon dams, 
would have not only reduced the flow of the river where it borders California, but would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Arizona v. California has been litigated	  in 1934, 1936, 1963, 1979, 1983, 1984 and 2000. I cite only the 
1963 case because it is the most relevant to the conditions which urged Arizona to push for a Central 
Arizona Project. 
9	  Arizona v. California, 373 US 546, (1963). http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.vassar.edu/hottopics/ln 
academic/?verb=sr&csi=4300 (accessed March 19, 2015); Pearson 2002.  
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also have flooded many miles of Grand Canyon National Park as well as Hualapai, 
Havasupai and Navajo lands and sacred sites.   
Not surprisingly, environmentalists were up in arms at the suggestion of 
inundating the Grand Canyon, a treasured piece of American wilderness, viewed by many 
as the “foremost national treasure” (Keller and Turek 1998, 131). The loss of Glen 
Canyon and Rainbow Bridge National Monument in the late 1950s led environmentalists 
to intensify their fight against the proposed dams in the Grand Canyon (Morehouse 1996, 
91; see also Pearson 2000, 305 and Dickey 2012). The Sierra Club spearheaded 
environmentalist efforts to stop the dams, launching a massive publicity campaign against 
the Bridge and Marble Canyon dams in the mid 1960s. David Brower and other Sierra 
Club leaders created the “Grand Canyon Battle Ads,” in which they pointed the finger at 
Stewart Udall and the Department of the Interior, hoping to influence their constituencies 
and scare them into backing off from Grand Canyon dams (sierraclub.org). Full-page ads 
against the construction of the dams, now memorialized in the Sierra Club’s vault, 
appeared in national newspapers including The New York Times. One such ad protested, 
“Should we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can get nearer the ceiling?” (Sierra 
Club 1966).10  
 Proponents of the dam anticipated this resistance, and strategized in order to deal 
with the response. As early as 1944 the Bureau of Reclamation had recommended 
adjusting the western boundary of Grand Canyon National park so that the Bridge 
Canyon Dam would lie entirely outside park lands (Morehouse 1996). The park’s 
superintendent Bryant found the boundary suggested by the Bureau in 1944 
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  See appendix for a copy of the 1966 ad.	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“unsatisfactory,” but agreed that “there would have to be some adjustment of the 
boundary to keep the reservoir that would be created by the dam out of the park” (Bryant 
1944 in Morehouse 1996, 90). This speaks to the “longstanding” inclination of the Park 
Service to adjust boundaries, often giving up territory whenever the “integrity” of the 
national parks is threatened (Morehouse 1996: 90). But as Sierra Club leader Bestor 
Robinson asked cheekily in a letter to Frederick Law Olmstead (an American landscape 
architect famous for his parks), “Did Nature in her great wisdom terminate the superlative 
portion of the Grand Canyon at the exact spot selected by twentieth-century engineers for 
a hydro-electric powerhouse?” (Robinson 1950). Rather than pushing back the park’s 
boundaries to keep the dam out, the Club thought it was “necessary to find a defensible 
western boundary line above which no reservoir would be permitted,” and then impose a 
moratorium on the construction of dams in the Grand Canyon (Morehouse 1996: 90).  
 While the dam proposals faced strong opposition from environmentalists who 
wanted to protect the Grand Canyon from being flooded by the dams, there were a 
multitude of interests and claims tied into the proposed dams that historical narratives of 
the Grand Canyon dam controversy tend to glaze over, representing it as a polarized issue 
between environmental conservationists such as the Sierra Club and water developers. 
Both the Hualapai Nation and Navajo Nations played important roles in the outcome, in 
which the dams were deleted from the CAP legislation before Congress passed it in 1968 
and a lease was signed between the Navajo Nation, the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
other future owners of the Navajo Generating Station.  
 The proposed site of the Bridge Canyon Dam, on the western end of the Hualapai 
Reservation, would have caused most of the canyon within the boundaries of the 
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Hualapai Nation to flood and would have backed water across the border into Grand 
Canyon National Monument (Pearson 2002). Furthermore, the proposed Marble Canyon 
Dam site would flood forty-six miles of Diné Bikéyah (the Navajo reservation) north of 
the Grand Canyon National Park (Dickey 2012:71). Given such threats to the 
reservations, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of the Interior feared that 
environmentalists would “ally themselves with Native Americans against the plan” for 
the CAP (Pearson 2000, 305). Assistant Secretary of the Interior John Carver believed 
that “putting the aesthetic and conservation factors aside,” the project “risked defeat if 
environmentalists and American Indians united against the dams” (Pearson 2000, 305). 
According to Pearson, “Arizona officials embarked hurriedly upon a program of damage 
control” (2000, 306). At a time of heightened awareness of civil rights issues, the rise of 
Red Power and the American Indian Movement, and the fact that dams would affect 
several tribes with ancestral homelands in the Grand Canyon region, “[b]oth 
environmentalists and CAP proponents tried to gain the support of the Hualapai and 
Navajo Nations in an attempt to manipulate rising public concerns about civil rights and 
race relations to their advantage during this pivotal environmental debate” (Pearson 2000, 
299). 11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  For a more nuanced understanding of the relationships between environmentalists and Native American 
groups, see Keller and Turek (1998). These authors provide further details on the attitudes of Hualapai, 
Havasupai, Navajo, Hopi and other tribes towards the NPS, the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth and other 
conservation organizations. For example, Havasupai spokesperson Lee Marshall criticized John McComb, 
1970s regional director for the Sierra Club, along with other environmentalists with organizations like 
Friends of the Earth, as wealthy, selfish, and “ignorant of nature” (Keller and Turek 1998, 179). According 
to Marshall, McComb was “just a city man like all the rest thinking about taking these lands so he can 
come up once or twice a year and have some recreation. Recreation! We are talking about survival while 
they talk about recreation. Where does the greed of these people stop?” (Keller and Turek 1998, 180). On 
the other hand, native grassroots organizations such as Save the Confluence, a Navajo group, speak 
outwardly against development projects like the proposed Grand Canyon Escalade.	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 The Hualapai were initially opposed to the Bridge Canyon dam, which would 
have flooded miles of the canyon they had lived in for thousands of years. Though a 
small tribe, with only about 1,300 tribal members, the Hualapai’s reservation covers 
about one million acres along the Colorado and in the Grand Canyon (hualapai-nsn.gov). 
However, the constitution the Hualapai had adopted in accordance with the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 granted the tribe sovereign rights over its territory, placing 
them in a strong position to either reject Arizona’s proposal for the Bridge Canyon dam 
or demand compensation (Pearson 2000). After a year of negotiations with the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the Department of the Interior, the Hualapai Nation took the route of 
compensation. The Tribal Council signed a contract with Arizona that would grant the 
Nation annual payments between $550,000 and $650,000 for the life of the dam, 
estimated 40 to 50 years; the Hualapai would also receive $16 million for the 
construction of the dam (ibid).  
 The CAP task force planned to use the support they had garnered from the 
Hualapai to battle environmentalists. Political manoeuvres and the promise of economic 
stimulation persuaded the Hualapai Tribal Council to support, even publicly advocate for, 
a federally financed Bridge Canyon Dam. CAP proponents wanted to publicize this 
support and paint environmentalists as anti-Indian. The CAP task force decided to send 
an “avalanche” of letters from not only the Hualapai Chairman but also other Arizona and 
Colorado tribes to Congress, President Johnson, Secretary Udall, and twelve thousand 
“Indian friends,” including a personalized letter to David Brower of the Sierra Club (to be 
released to the press), emphasizing that the dam would “enable them to cast off their 
bonds of poverty” (Alexander in Pearson 2000:311). However, it was Central Arizona 
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Project Association President Rich Johnson who wrote and composed the letters; 
Hualapai Chief George Rocha was merely asked to contribute his signature, along with 
“some Hualapai Tribal Council letterhead” (ibid). Additionally, Hualapai Chief Rocha 
testified before Congress that the Bridge Canyon dam proposed in H.R. 4671, the original 
CAP legislation, “constituted his people’s only hope for economic salvation and stressed 
that without it they would continue to live in poverty” (Pearson 2000: 309).  
 But the dam would have also flooded miles of tribal grazing and hunting lands, 
and I would go so far as to suggest that not all members of the tribe would have been 
happy with this outcome, despite the Tribal Council’s stance in favor of the project. 
However I have not conducted any interviews which would allow me to test this claim 
and cannot speak to individual or group attitudes regarding the proposed dam. 
 The Navajo Nation, however, passed a resolution against the dam-powered CAP 
project as a whole due to the fact that the Navajo Nation, unlike the Hualapai, would not 
receive any compensation for a structure at Marble Canyon (Dickey 2012, 78-79). 
Because the dam was to be built on a site that the federal government did not recognize 
as belonging to the Navajo reservation, the Navajo Nation’s efforts to get compensation 
for the dam failed. The “legal muddle” over the Marble Canyon site led the Bureau of 
Reclamation to refuse to compensate the Diné, and ultimately the Federal Power 
Commission awarded Arizona a license to build the dam at Marble Canyon despite the 
Navajo Tribal Council’s claims to the site (ibid).12 Thus, the Navajo would not receive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Arizona, in the years after its admission to the Union in 1912, had been allowed to reserve power sites 
along the Colorado for future utilization, and Marble Canyon was one of those sites. But in 1930, 
“Congress transferred parts of the Tusayan National Forest, including the dam site, to the Navajo tribe, 
while preserving ‘all valid rights and claims of individuals initiated prior to approval of the Act’” (Pearson 
2000, 301-302). Congress enlarged the Navajo reservation in 1934, but preserved Arizona's power site 
withdrawals and nullified the provisions of the Federal Power Act that would have given the Navajo Nation 
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any revenue from the dam while forty-six miles of Diné Bikéyah (the Navajo reservation) 
would be flooded (Dickey 2012, 71). Furthermore, the Bureau of Reclamation had 
initiated site preparations (for both dams) even before they obtained the licenses, without 
permission from the Navajo or Hualapai tribes (Pearson 2000). In what Pearson deems 
“an amazing display of hubris,” the Bureau resumed these preparations in the 1960s when 
Hayden and Udall had revived plans for the CAP (2000, 304).  
 Without the hope of any financial benefit for the dam, the Navajo Tribal Council 
passed resolution CAU-97-66 on August 3rd, 1966 condemning the dams and “citing the 
‘ruthless character’ of CAP lobbyists” (Dickey 2012, 79). The resolution also stated the 
Council’s plan to “exploit the ‘huge deposits of coal’ buried in the Four Corners on Black 
Mesa,” which had been developing while the controversy over the dams raged (ibid). 
Quoted in a Gallup Independent article from August 4, 1966, councilmember Annie 
Dodge Wauneka states that the Council had “concluded agreements with Peabody Coal 
Co. and Utah Construction Co. for burning Navajo coal,” and that “hydropower cannot 
possibly compete with cheaper thermo-electric plants stoked with Reservation coal” 
(Dickey 2012, 80).  
 Thus, all of these factors—opposition from California congressmen, the Sierra 
Club and the Navajo Tribal Council—contributed to the passage of a “bare-bones” CAP, 
minus the dams, in September of 1968 when President Lyndon Johnson signed the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968 into law13 (Pearson 1998, 8). The legislation 
for the CAP authorized the construction of the canal itself, which would divert water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a claim against the state. Consequently, Arizona stood in a strong legal position to claim the site in 1960 
because Congress had granted it the right to utilize this reach of the Colorado River for hydroelectric 
projects, and maintained it even though it was surrounded by Navajo lands (Pearson 2000: 301-302). 
13	  See appendix for a copy of the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968.	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from Lake Havasu (an already established reservoir closer to the termination of the 
Colorado River). In place of the Grand Canyon dams, the Department of the Interior 
signed on to the contract for the Navajo Generating Station to provide the power for the 
CAP. When the council approved the Navajo Generating Station lease in May of 1969, 
the NTC had already entered into agreements with Peabody Coal Company to lease land 
on Black Mesa. Contracting the Navajo Generating Station to provide the power for the 
CAP was therefore a way for the Navajo Nation to secure revenue from the CAP that 
they had not been able to secure via the Marble Canyon dam. 
 Thus the history of the NGS is important in understanding the actual siting of the 
plant as well as its relationship to water today. My purpose in detailing the controversy 
has been to show the ways in which political-ecological processes (including political, 
social and economic factors), as performed by a variety of actors (including the Bureau of 
Reclamation, Congress, the Hualapai and Navajo Tribal Councils, the Sierra Club and 
private water interests) transform landscapes. The NGS was born out of struggles over 
water, and it continues to reinforce spatial networks of consumption and distribution 
which favor the development of cities over Navajo lands. In fact these networks facilitate 
the sacrifice of Navajo lands and bodies in order to provide water and electricity to 
Arizona’s cities.   
 When the Navajo Tribal Council signed the lease that established NGS, it agreed 
to sign away over half of its own apportionment from the Colorado River for the plant. 
As a result, 34,000 acre-feet (of a 50,000 af apportionment) are set aside each year for 
use in coal transportation, ash disposal and for cooling the NGS’s three tower units 
(Indenture of Lease: Navajo Units 1, 2 and 3 1969, 40; Navajo Tribal Council Resolution 
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CD-108-63). And as the N aquifer under Black Mesa is increasingly depleted, the need 
for local water infrastructure on the Navajo and Hopi reservations becomes more dire. 
While access to potable water supplies on the reservations suffers, Phoenix’s manicured 
lawns flourish. These two phenomena are both inextricably entwined, linked by steel-
supported electrical lines, concrete and the flow of water and energy across the largest 
and possibly the driest (Lamoureux 2012) stretch of Native American lands in the United 
States. Power relationships are embedded in the very landscape: in the flow of the rivers 
across the plateaus and through deep canyons, in the dried-up Mexican delta, in urban 
neighborhoods and the banks of creeks where radioactive waste seeps deep into the strata 
downstream of the dumping sites, even in the hazy air of the four corners region where 
nitrous oxides and particulate matter contaminate bodies and scenic vistas.  
 I have explored the history of the NGS, and now I turn to its geography. While the 
Grand Canyon Dam controversy can illuminate how the NGS came to be, it is also 
important to understand its location. At the edge of the Navajo reservation, just outside 
Page, Arizona—a town known to its international visitors as an outdoor adventure town 
on the outskirts of Lake Powell—and a mere twelve miles from the Grand Canyon, the 
NGS lies in a border zone. Environmental justice studies seek to understand the siting of 
power plants and other industrial hazards in light of social theory which takes into 
account the spatialized and intersectional nature of race- and class-based discrimination, 
in both its discrete and structural forms. With all this in mind, I turn to Page, Arizona to 
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Chapter 3 
Tracing Power Line-ages in Page: Choosing a Location for the Navajo Generating 
Station 
 In 1958, Paul Jones, a former chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, traded a 
“barren, sandy, desolate mesa” next to the Colorado River on the Navajo reservation 
(once called Manson Mesa for one of the Diné families that used it as grazing land) with 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation, in exchange for ancestral land on McCracken 
Mesa in Utah (Ward, Keisling, and the Powell Museum 2014). This land became the 
town of Page, where the Bureau built a hydroelectric dam in Glen Canyon next to the 
newly acquired lands. Workers came by the thousands to construct the dam, which was 
completed in 1963 and currently holds steadfast Lake Powell, the second largest man-
made lake in the United States14 (Ward, Keisling, and the Power Museum 2014: 7). In the 
early 1970s, the NGS came to Page, and it is now home to two major Bureau of 
Reclamation projects. Both of these controversial projects are central figures of the 
landscape of Page. The three smokestacks of the Navajo Generating Station protrude 775 
feet out of the red dirt desert, towering higher than any building in the American 
Southwest (Friederici 2015). The plume generated by these units rises even higher into 
the sky, making it even more conspicuous; on a clear, relatively still day, the plume 
coming from the NGS is easily visible from dozens of miles away. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Lake Mead, at Hoover Dam, on the border between Arizona and Nevada, is the largest.	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Figure 1: Navajo Generating Station, Page Arizona 2015. Photo taken by author. 
 
 The central research question of this thesis explores how Page, Arizona came to 
be the site of one of the country’s largest and dirtiest coal-fired plants. In the previous 
chapter, I established that the NGS came about as an alternative power source for the 
CAP, but in this chapter I examine Page, specifically in order to understand the factors 
that influenced the actual siting of the plant. NGS is technically located on Navajo Nation 
lands 5 miles outside of Page, but as the nearest town, Page plays an integral role in 
supporting the generating station. Furthermore, Page and the NGS occupy a zone of 
overlapping and intersecting spaces between several national wilderness/recreation areas 
and the Navajo Nation, which is significant because the siting of industrial facilities takes 
on particular implications when it comes to border regions. Thus, how was Page 
constructed as the “ideal” location for the NGS?  
 In conducting my research, I searched through correspondences, Navajo Tribal 
Council minutes and resolutions, land leases, Department of the Interior statements, 
newspaper articles, but came across very few clues about the decision-making process 
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which facilitated the siting of the NGS in Page. Given the lack of discrete information 
available as to why the NGS is located in Page (as opposed to somewhere else on the 
Navajo Reservation), I am forced to do a broader analysis of power plant siting in order 
to make inferences about this particular case. 
 In general, however, there are a few key constraints that influence the 
establishment of a power plant: access to a steady supply of coal, large quantities of 
water, and sufficient labor. Page satisfies each of these constraints. It is a small worker 
town with an established infrastructure and a need for jobs, located only about 90 miles 
from Black Mesa’s Kayenta Mine site, where Peabody Western Coal Company leases 
lands from the Navajo Nation to strip-mine coal. It is just a few miles from the shores of 
Lake Powell, the flooded canyon reservoir created by Glen Canyon dam, which provides 
a source of water for the plant’s cooling towers.15 An NGS-produced pamphlet cites the 
advantages of its location outside Page, “including access to competitively priced coal, an 
adequate supply of water from Lake Powell, and nearby established communities with an 
established work force” (NGS 2007, 4). Ultimately, the plant cannot function without 
access to these three things, all of which are necessary for the plant to be profitable.  
 Very likely, it would take an entire cohort of economic development specialists 
and planners to flesh out the details of a profitable plant location. Alternatively, perhaps 
the location of the plant is somewhat arbitrary, as long as access to the necessary 
resources can be guaranteed. But I have one other piece of information that I believe to 
be highly relevant to the siting of the plant: the fact that Page is a border region, a place 
of intersection between the “core” and the “periphery;” between the “global South” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact allocates 50,000 acre-feet of water annually to Arizona, but 
since the only portion of Arizona within the Upper Colorado River Basin is Navajo Reservation land, this 
50,000 af is interpreted as belonging to the Navajo. 
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the “global North;” Page is an American, “developed” space bordering the Navajo 
Nation—an “undeveloped” Native reservation. It is a global interface.  
  Other scholars have written extensively on why border regions matter when 
thinking about the siting of hazardous industries and facilities (Clapp 2001; Frey 2003; 
Johnstone 1995). These authors suggest that global networks for trade and investment 
facilitate the (re)location of hazards from richer to poorer countries, in part to avoid 
regulatory restrictions on production processes (Clapp 2001; Frey 2003). But what about 
hazards located within “richer” countries such as the United States? Recent theorizations 
in the field of political ecology of the “Third World within” seek to better understand this 
process (Schroeder et al. 2006). These theories have reconceptualized how global capital 
investment shapes space according to either structuralist arguments—which assert that 
the same forces that produce the “Third World as such are responsible for creating 
peripheries, backwaters, wastelands, remote areas, etc. within advanced capitalist nations 
as well”—or alternatively, by completely rejecting the First World/Third World binary 
altogether (Schroeder et al. 2006, 166). This second approach, which draws on post-
structuralism, “’re-reads’ the First World for heterogeneity and diversity” arguing that 
spaces we have “always assumed to be purely capitalist always carry within them 
elements that we now commonly associate with the Third World” (ibid). In imagining 
Page and the edge it shares with Navajo Reservation within the framework of these 
theories, we see that it is a space which interfaces between “core” and “periphery”; “First 
World” and “Third World.” Thus while there are many reasons why the NGS was 
established in Page which are both “practical” and geographical, they are deeply related 
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to larger spatial processes which are involved in the export of hazardous industries to 
“undeveloped” countries and border regions. 
 What is the work that is done in thinking of Page as a border zone, a space that is 
simultaneously part of the “core” and the “periphery?” Does this factor in to the siting of 
the NGS in Page? Despite the political boundaries delineating Page, the Navajo Nation, 
and the nearby wilderness areas, these spaces are very much overlapping. Geographer 
Doreen Massey suggests that in thinking about place we must acknowledge their multiple 
identities and the ways in which they defy coherent identities as well as enclosure or 
definition within boundaries (1991). She challenges the idea that sense of place is 
constructed through an “inward-looking” history that looks for internalized origins of a 
place’s character, imagining them instead as “articulated moments in networks of social 
relations and understandings” (Massey 1991, 66). So, applying this to Page, the town 
becomes not just a purely “American” space but also a Native one. 
 The significance of this in terms of the Navajo Generating Station is that the siting 
of the largest and dirtiest coal-fired power plant in the state of Arizona next to Page does 
not make sense when holding the view of Page as a predominantly white, “core”-type 
space which lies twelve miles from the border of Grand Canyon National Park, next to 
Lake Powell and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. These are tourist sites, and 
Page is a tourist town. With a population of approximately 7,326, over 57 percent are 
Anglo, 34 percent are Native American, and less than 7 percent are Latino/a or Hispano/a 
(United States Census Bureau 2010). But this is not Page’s only identity: only it is 
intimately linked to the Navajo Nation, both today as border zone and historically as a 
part of the Navajo reservation itself. 
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 It is important to keep in mind how recently the lands that are now Page once 
belonged to the Navajo. Only about sixty years ago, Manson Yazzie, Diné, and 
approximately seven other Diné families, used the land to graze sheep (Powell Museum 
2007; Ward, Keisling and the Powell Museum Archives 2014). As power over the space 
shifted from a handful of Navajo families into the hands of the Bureau of Reclamation, 
the landscape changed quickly and dramatically. Families living on the lands that were 
transferred were relocated to other reservation lands, in many cases without prior 
consultation (Ward, Keisling and the Powell Museum Archives 2014). The Glen Canyon 
Dam and the NGS have transformed Page from a ‘sandy, desolate mesa’ into an 
Anglicised ‘frontier town,’ wedged between the reservation and the Grand Canyon (ibid). 
 In the late 1950s, with the beginning of the construction of Glen Canyon Dam, 
thousands of workers flowed to what soon became Page in order to work on the dam. As 
arrays of trailers began to populate the mesa, the Bureau built access roads and developed 
infrastructure in the town in order to support the new population. For the Diné previously 
occupying the mesa, nomadic lifestyles disappeared in the area. Carol Manson, daughter-
in-law of Manson Yazzie, lived in the area before the land was handed over and describes 
the nomadic life she and her family had before the settlement in the following quote: 
We used to move around a lot at that time with our sheep. We never stay 
in the same place…because there was no spring, we always had to haul 
water and we depend a lot on the rain….We did have a Hogan, right east 
of where the highway ends now, we used to have a hogan there, and then, 
closer to Coppermine also. But, at that time, when you built a Hogan, and 
the next person that comes along, you can share that Hogan with another 
family because you never lock the Hogan…You just leave it open for the 
next family to move in and that’s the way it used to be…There’s been a 
lot of change. (Powell Museum 2007: 6-7) 
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 The building of Glen Canyon dam initiated changes in everyday life for those 
Diné families affected by the land trade. Before the establishment of Page, Manson and 
other Diné who used the mesa hauled water and wood for themselves and there was no 
electricity, no refrigerator or freezer (ibid). Now, says Manson, “so many things have 
changed and it makes us lazy.” She is grateful, she says, that she was able to get a job in 
the burgeoning town, like many other Navajos living near Page. Starting in 1963, she 
worked at the hospital as a nurses’ assistant, which allowed her to stay close to her 
family; otherwise she “would have had to go somewhere else to find work” (Manson in 
Powell Museum 2007: 8). Many Navajos found employment with Merrit-Chapman and 
Scott Corporation, the company contracted to build the dam.  
 In the first years of the construction process, Page was no more than a trailer 
town. The Bureau of Reclamation soon built “transit houses”—pre-fabricated houses 
similar to double-wide trailers but meant to be set on a foundation—for the workers and 
officials (Urban in Powell Museum 2007: 14). By 1957, the Glen Canyon Dam 
construction camp had expanded into a bustling town (Ward, Keisling and the Powell 
Museum Archives 2014: 53). Thus, construction of the dam created an “instant federal 
city” at Page (Durrenberger 1972: 234).  
Page’s remote setting made many things difficult for its new residents, however, 
such as emergency medical transportation and the cost of supplies (ibid). Merrit-
Chapman and Scott Corporation paid the workers very little—not enough to cover the 
high costs associated with life in Page, which was (and still is) far from any other 
population centers, and many workers had to leave. In 1959, workers went on strike 
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against Merritt-Chapman and Scott Corporation demanding higher wages. Those who 
remained celebrated the end of the strike six months later on Christmas Eve of 1959.  
 Page’s population peaked in 1962, at the height of dam construction, with 
approximately 6,100 residents. Five years later, following the completion of the dam and 
the subsequent lack of jobs, the population fell to only 1,250. But as Lake Powell became 
a popular recreation spot, tourism began to grow. Then when the NGS came to Page in 
the 1970s, another population boom took place. Situating the power plant just outside 
Page grew the town substantially. Though its population has fluctuated since then, it is 
now above what it was at the height of dam construction, at about 7,326 (United States 
Census Bureau 2010). The NGS likes to publicize the number of Navajo employees it 
has, and that it privileges Navajo applicants in its hiring process. According to the Salt 
River Project, the corporation that manages the NGS, the plant employs a total of 520 
workers, 70 percent of whom are Navajo (2007). The NGS draws Navajos from all over 
the reservation to work and live in Page. 
  When the plant was brought to Page, it’s operators promised to provide 
electricity, running water and other ‘modern comforts’ to nearby Navajo reservation 
residents (Friederici 2015). As Betty Thompson recalls, representatives from both the 
Navajo Nation and the Salt River Project came to her mother’s door, imploring her to 
sign away some of her lands: 
Give up just some of your land, and we will provide you and your family with a 
better life, they said. Electricity, running water. Financial stability. Maybe better 
houses for you and your children, and jobs at the plant. (Rowe 2013) 
 
 In 2014, nine months after her mother’s passing and 44 years after the 
construction of NGS, did Betty Thompson see the electric line to her mother’s house 
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completed (ibid). And yet hundreds of miles of EHV power lines carry power in the 
opposite direction from the NGS to the far-off cities of central and southern Arizona, and 
to Lake Havasu, where the CAP taps into the Rio Colorado. Cities, which “have emerged 
as centers for the production, exchange, and consumption of their environments as 
commodities,” rely on networks of these commodities and the channels which connect 
them to the resources they need to survive (Lefebvre 1991, 1996, 2003 and Robbins, 
Polderman and Birkenholtz 2001 in Heynen 2006, 4). In other words, they consume the 
resources of marginalized, often distant communities such as the Navajo Nation by 
engineering long lines of power lines and concrete canals that connect them (but also 
distance them) from the sources of water and power that they so heavily depend on. 
These channels and networks work to externalize the environmental and social costs of 
production to “marginal” lands such as the Navajo Nation. 
 The Navajo Generating Station sustains itself by consuming Navajo water, 
Navajo coal, Navajo labor, and it benefits from the simultaneously core and peripheral 
spaces overlapping in Page, at the border of the reservation. While I cannot fully explain 
the situation of the NGS outside Page, I have done my best to analyze it using a broader 
understanding of the spatial relationships and constellations of power involved in the 
situation of industrial facilities. What’s more, the processes which have played a role in 
constructing the NGS are more than skin-deep. In the next chapter I will discuss how the 
bounding of the Navajo has influenced the siting of the generating station, which is a 
story of Navajo dispossession (both historically, via removal from a “pristine” nature and 
today, via relocation from homes and residences across the reservation). The effects of 
the coal industry run deep on the reservation. As Jihan Gearon of the Black Mesa Water 
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Coalition explains in an interview, in addition to the continued lack of electricity and 
running water on the reservation, 
there’s the whole issue of relocation where people were forcibly moved off of 
their traditional homelands to make way for mining, which has caused all kinds of 
problems…our whole economy is totally stagnant because of the coal industry. 
It’s like our one-trip pony. And that has made us economically dependent on our 
own cultural destruction. (Rowe 2013) 
  
The NGS is a social, political/economic project, and it is thus embedded in the 
landscape of Page and nested in the overlapping territories of the Navajo Nation and the 
Grand Canyon region. It is part of the lived material landscape of Page, in its 
multiplicities and interrelations. While historical-geographical processes have led to the 
construction of Page as the “ideal” location for the NGS, the relationship between Page 
and the Navajo Generating Station is dialectical; Page and the NGS both do work on each 
other and are produced through each other.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Colonization of the internal variety: 
 
Taming Nature and the Navajo through territorial bounding  
 
 Native people didn’t like fences put up at the rim on the east side and so they tore them 
down. I come from a culture where there are no fences, no windows, no gates, no closed-
in yards. (Alice Talakte, park ranger at Grand Canyon National Park, in Burnham 2000, 
284) 
 
 As Alice Talakte, who grew up south of Page on the Navajo Reservation, 
explains, the Navajo have a sense of boundaries, but not fenced ones. The western edge 
of the Navajo reservation borders the Grand Canyon, which also borders the Havasupasi 
and Hualapai nations to the west: 85 percent, or 230 miles, of the Grand Canyon’s 
southern and eastern borders face Native American tribes whose land-holdings are nearly 
twelve times the size of the park (Keller and Turek 1998, 132). While federal restrictions 
prohibit natural resource development in the National Park, it is surrounded by lands 
harmed by ongoing strip mining, and polluted with radioactive ash from coal plants, 
nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and monoxide, mercury and other toxins. The Grand 
Canyon represents a nature that, for environmentalists, should be protected for “its own 
sake, for its beauty and pristine qualities, for wildlife habitat, or for recreation” (Taylor 
1988). On the other hand, the Navajo reservation represents a different kind of nature: 
one to be consumed, produced, commodified. In this chapter I examine how these two 
different “natures” have been constructed and produced, combining the concept of 
socionature with the insights about territoriality and space brought up in the previous 
chapter. How did the bounding of the Navajo, and, relatedly, the bounding of nature, 
facilitate the siting of the NGS? 
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 A history of dispossession connects the bounding of nature to the bounding of the 
Navajo. The creation of parks and wilderness areas in the United States goes hand in 
hand with the dispossession of Native people. Nature is “a central site of a particularly 
potent and exclusionary idea of U.S. nationalism—from the work of Frederick Jackson 
Turner to the creation of the national parks (Kosek 2006, 227). The purification of a 
“pristine nature” connotes the ideological separation of the social and the natural. This 
division is both productive, in the sense that it produces and maintains spaces as either 
one or the other (i.e. the urban as social and the wild as natural), and destructive, in the 
sense that separating the social from the natural facilitates the destruction of some spaces 
at the expense of the preservation of others. Thus, consecrated parks and wilderness areas 
“are, in essence, monuments to the ideological separation between nature and society,” 
and thus the dispossession of Native peoples (Kosek 2006, 157). 
 The ideological divide, however, must be deconstructed. The social and the 
natural are inextricably intertwined, and one cannot transform or modify one without also 
affecting the other (Swyngedouw 1999). Swyngedouw’s concept of “socionature” 
engages with the entanglement of the social and the natural and the power dynamics 
expressed in the making of socionatural landscapes. With this in mind, my project in this 
chapter is to illuminate the linkages between the bounding of Nature and the bounding of 
the Navajo, the mutually constituted, dialectical relationship between Navajo 
dispossession and the construction of wilderness, and therefore the intimate connection 
between the Navajo Generating Station and Navajo bodies. 
 Federal policies around nature and the Navajo has created the reservation as a 
national sacrifice zone, the function of which is to concentrate the burden of 
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environmental destruction on non-white, particularly Native American, populations and 
territory. As the creation of wilderness and National Parks has facilitated the whitening of 
these spaces and, since many National Parks border Native American lands and contain 
ancestral native lands, the racial contrast between spaces of wilderness in America and 
native spaces is stark. When it comes to racism against Native groups, the segregation of 
space through federal policy (namely, the establishment of reservations) combines with 
complex processes of environmental exploitation to constitute a conscious and malicious 
form of racism. 
 Much of the experience of Native Americans today is defined by life on 
reservations, a reality which began with the establishment of the reservation system in the 
mid 1800s. While the rich and extensive pre-reservation history of Native Americans also 
continues to define contemporary Native American culture and identity and is owed a 
much more in-depth exploration than I give here, my focus is on the formative federal 
violence, legislation and attitude in the mid-19th century which created the reservation 
system, further stripping Native Americans across the continental United States of their 
ancestral homelands. The Removal Act of 1830 required that tribes east of the 
Mississippi consent to sell their lands and move westward. This resulted in the “Trail of 
Tears,”16 in which those tribes that refused to go voluntarily were rounded up by the U.S. 
military and marched west (Miller 2012, 41). Many thousands died along these marches 
(ibid). While the Removal Act contributed to the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans, 
the Indian Appropriations Act, which encompasses a series of acts passed between 1851 
and 1889, authorized the creation of the first reservations, purportedly to protect Native 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The Trail of Tears is used specifically in reference to the forced removal of the Cherokee people, but this 
experience is not unique to the Cherokee (see Hooks and Smith 2004).  
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Americans in the West from the encroachment of white settlers and to “make peace.”17 
But in effect this policy allowed the federal government to force tribes onto small and 
remote pieces of land (Miller 2012, 41). Thus, federal policies such as Indian Removal 
and the Reservation System facilitated the ethnic cleansing, relocation, dispossession and 
bounding of Native peoples. The effects of this process of colonization persist today.  
 The experience of colonization, while it affects every Native American tribe in 
the continental United States, is different for each tribe. The Navajo, a tribe of over 
200,000 members today, were dispossessed and exiled by the United States in 1864 
(Keller and Turek 1998, 186). With the Louisiana Purchase and the terms imposed on 
Mexico at the end of the Mexican-American war, the U.S. Federal Government claimed 
ownership of virtually all the land west of the Mississippi by via the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo by 1848 (Hooks and Smith 2004). Violence and warfare between Mexicans, 
Navajos, and the U.S. government characterized the decade before the Civil War. The 
U.S. Army asserted control over these lands through a series of Indian Wars in which it 
forced western tribes onto reservation lands of the federal government’s choosing (Hooks 
and Smith 2004, 563). In one such “Indian War” designed to eliminate the Diné people, 
“The Kit Carson Campaign,” the U.S. Army attempted to establish control over what is 
now part of northeastern Arizona and western New Mexico (including the current Navajo 
and Hopi Nations) for ranching and mining (Churchill 2002, 135). This war reached a 
peak in 1864 when the U.S. government forcibly removed the Diné to the Bosque 
Redondo, a small reservation in New Mexico. 
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  Hooks and Smith (2004).	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 During the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo, the Army forced approximately 8,000 
Navajos to walk 200 miles to a small camp in eastern New Mexico where between a 
quarter to a half of the Diné died of disease, exposure and starvation in just two years18 
(Morehouse 1996; Churchill 2002; also see Roberts 1997). The Diné spent four years in 
the Bosque Redondo, after which the United States federal government “relented and 
entered into a treaty with the Diné” in order to avoid a scandal19 (Churchill 2002, 136). 
The Treaty of 1868 designated a 3.5 million-acre reservation for the Diné in the 
northeastern corner of Arizona and crossing over into northwestern New Mexico.20 The 
reservation, now over twenty-five thousand square miles—larger than Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut combined—covers much of the land the 
Diné have inhabited since they migrated into the Four Corners area five centuries ago 
(Keller and Turek 1998, 186). According to Morehouse, 
This was the first instance in which Indian lands in the greater Grand Canyon 
were given new identity and substance through the drawing of boundaries. It was 
also the first instance in which the federal government set aside lands in the 
greater Grand Canyon region for political purposes, in this case, to protect them 
(by putting them in trust status) for the Navajo. (1996, 21) 
 
But as Churchill, Miller and others have clearly demonstrated, the federal government’s 
intent in putting aside lands for reservations was not to “protect” them for tribes such as 
the Navajo, but rather to isolate Native Americans onto specified lands so that European 
settlers could continue to establish occupancy across the continent without coming into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The number that died at the Bosque Redondo is unclear. Morehouse (1996) notes that 2,000 Diné 
perished in the camp, a quarter of the total number, but provides no citation for this number. Churchill 
(2002, 135) however, citing Trafzer (1982), Thompson (1982) and Roessel (1973), states that over half—
more than 4,000 Diné—perished in just the first two years at the camp.  
19	  According to Churchill (2002, 136), the government risked scandal with respect to the Bosque Redondo 
camp because it had recently executed Confederate Army officers for “comparable atrocities” against U.S. 
troops at prison Camps such as Andersonville.	  
20	  See appendix for a copy of the Treaty of 1868 (scanned from the Raymond Nakai Collection, Cline 
Library Special Collections, Northern Arizona University).  
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conflict with Natives. In the Navajo case, it is the tribe’s own initiative and assertiveness 
in the negotiation process which allowed them to obtain a sizeable land base for the 
Navajo reservation (Keller and Turek 1998). This accomplishment can only be seen as 
one which the Diné achieved despite the federal government, not because of it. 
According to Keller and Turek (1998), in 1923 the Navajo became one of the first tribes 
to “organize a government capable of expanding its land base and economy while 
resisting pressures from the United States;”21 some smaller tribes view the Navajo as the 
“Second Coming of the White Man” because of this initiative and assertiveness (186).  
 Though far from giving “new identity and substance” to the Navajo “through the 
drawing of boundaries,” the creation of the Navajo reservation was indeed a political 
achievement for the federal government in some ways (quoted in Morehouse, above). 
According to Churchill, the federal agenda for reservation lands has always been clear: 
the “ironically” barren, residual Native American land base in the United States and 
Canada are rich in natural resources—yet Native economies do not reflect the wealth of 
their lands because by keeping these natural resource assets pooled in reserved areas 
under “trust authority” the federal government is able to “channel” them at very low rates 
to “preferred corporations, using a ‘tribal’ administrative apparatus” (Churchill 2002, 
239-40). In other words, its agenda for the reservation lands is nothing short of 
exploitation. Churchill further corroborates this argument by referring to Native 
American exploitation as a process of internal colonialism, which is worth quoting at 
length here: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  It should be noted, however, that this tribal government, the Council of Elders, was disassembled about a 
decade later by the federal government and replaced with a system of representatives of United States 
choosing (Churchill 2002).	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[The] boon [of channelling native assets] to the U.S. and Canadian economies has 
been enhanced by the governments’ utilization of a self-proclaimed “plenary” 
power over Indians and Indian land to relax or dispense with environmental 
protection standards and job safety regulations, further lowering extraction and 
production costs while allowing certain of the more odious forms of production 
and waste disposal associated with advanced industrial technologies to be 
conveniently located—out of sight and mind of the mainstream public—in areas 
occupied primarily by native people [cites Kelly 1979 and Ruffing 1980]. In 
substance, we have been consigned to a status of “expendability” by federal, state 
and corporate economic planners in both Canada and the United States [cites 
Coates and Powell 1989]. From the perspective of North America’s social, 
political and economic élites, the advantages of maintaining discrete Indian 
territories under trust control thus greatly outweigh any potential benefit accruing 
from from final absorption of these residual areas [cites Garrity 1980]. The 
history of conquest, militarily or otherwise, which has always marked the 
U.S./Canadian relationship to Native North America, has correspondingly 
transformed itself into a process of colonization, albeit of an “internal” variety 
peculiar to highly evolved settler states… (2002, 240) 
 
 Essentially, by maintaining reservations, the United States (and as Churchill 
argues, Canada as well) has successfully created lands where it can export industrial 
production without having to deal with environmental or labor standards—which it has 
done in many other countries, most notably China—where it can perform much of the 
‘dirty work’ of modernization without suffering much consequence. Thus as I have 
brought up in previous chapters, reservations—and I speak specifically of the Navajo 
Nation—have  become America’s “national sacrifice zones.” 
 For the Diné, reservationization in 1868 did return them to much of their previous 
homeland, but it also permitted their continued colonization through physical/territorial 
bounding. Up until the Long Walk the U.S. Army had been attempting to eliminate the 
Diné people as what the military perceived as a threat to ranching and mining concerns, 
burning Diné orchards and targeting their sheep herds in an effort to starve them into 
submission (Churchill 2002). While the Treaty of 1868 between the Unites States and the 
Navajo tribe states that “From this day forward all war between the parties to this 
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agreement shall forever cease,” that both the Government of the United States and the 
Indians “desire peace, and they now pledge their honor to keep it,” neither the treaty or 
any other formal agreement with the Navajos prevented the U.S. government and its 
commercial cohorts from exploiting Navajo lands—or bodies.   
 After the establishment of the reservation in 1868, it was discovered that much of 
the reservation lands were usable for grazing, and so the government consequently 
“adjusted” the boundaries westward into Arizona so that the eastern portion could be 
used for ranching and grazing (Churchill 2002). However, another people inhabited the 
area of Arizona that the boundaries were adjusted to include: the Hopi. Churchill explains 
that at first, there was no “particular problem” with this in many ways (2002, 136). The 
Diné, who lived dispersed across the land and based their economy on sheep herding, 
largely coexisted with the Hopi agriculturalists (ibid). But in 1882, when President 
Chester A. Arthur sought to provide Indian agent J.H. Fleming with a jurisdictional basis 
for helping Mormon missionaries kidnap Hopi children in order “to educate them,” 
carved out a portion of the lands reserved for the Diné for a Hopi reservation (Churchill 
2002, 136).  
 The Hopi and Diné maintained this coexistence for a generation, but beginning in 
the 1920s it became clear that the remote, seemingly economically useless reservation 
lands were rich in mineral deposits. When the Standard Oil Company wanted to negotiate 
mineral leases with the Diné, and the Diné Council of Elders were unanimously opposed, 
Standard lobbied and federal authorities replaced the Council of Elders with a “Grand 
Council” made up of men educated off-reservation of U.S. choosing (Churchill 2002). 
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The new council then signed leases for mineral extraction, kick-starting the mining 
operations and igniting a Navajo-Hopi land dispute (ibid).  
This dispute continues to affect the realities of Navajos and Hopis. As an article 
published in The Arizona Republic on Februray 9, 2015 states that the federal 
government's efforts to have the Navajo and Hopi share land “failed miserably, leading to 
one of the largest single relocation efforts in U.S. history” (“Lawmakers seek to wrap up 
costly Navajo-Hopi relocation program”). Thousands of Navajos and dozens of Hopis 
have since been transplanted into new homes. While the Navajo-Hopi dispute is generally 
framed as going back centuries and as an ethnic conflict, it can instead be traced to have 
origins in corporate and government plans to develop mineral extraction on Black Mesa 
(Lacerenza 1988). In the mid-1950s, when Arizona looked to Black Mesa’s coal reserves 
to solve its growing energy needs, a coalition of twenty-one utility companies 
implemented a plan to develop the area, which culminated in the 1974 Navajo-Hopi Land 
Settlement Act, under which the Bureau of Indian Affairs relocated 10-15,000 Navajos 
and dozens of Hopis (ibid). According to Lacerenza, “The idea that this relocation was 
caused by a land dispute between the Navajo and Hopi people is a distortion of reality, a 
diversion created by business interests in order to gain access to the land and its energy 
sources”22 (1988). While according to both Hopi and Paiute interpretations the Hopi were 
the first occupants of the area, then the Spanish, followed by the Diné, and then the white 
people, the Navajo and Hopi lived in relative coexistence until the creation of 
reservations (Keller and Turek 1998). The two tribes have occupied the same territory for 
centuries, as “Navajos tended to be more nomadic sheepherders and Hopis mostly resided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Lacerenza’s article provides the background information for the 1974 Act, which covers the 1868 
Treaty, the creation of Tribal Councils, the establishment of the Hopi Reservation and the Navajo-Hopi 
Joint Use Area, big business interests, land disputes and mineral rights, resettlement and relocation. 
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on three mesas towering above the surrounding desert” (The Arizona Republic 2015). 
But the Diné became a more settled people as they assimilated elements of Pueblo, 
Spanish, and American cultures such as “weaving, horses, sheep, horticulture, 
representative government, liquor, pickup trucks…” (Keller and Turek 1998). This brings 
me to yet another aspect of colonization that resulted from the bounding of the Diné: 
sedentarization. 
The sedentarization of nomadic peoples is a critical tactic of the state in asserting 
its power over a territory (Grinde and Johnasen 1995; Scott 1998). In an attempt to 
sedentarize the nomadic Navajo and thus bound and control them, the government issued 
the Navajo 34,000 sheep and goats when the treaty was signed (“the idea was to make the 
Navajos self-sufficient sheepherders and thus pacify them”) (Grinde and Johansen 1995, 
112). American policy has historically been (and continues to be) biased firstly “in favor 
of the white rather than the red race” and secondly, in favor of the sedentary Pueblo 
populations versus the more mobile Navajos (Grinde and Johansen 1995, 110). Political 
theorist James Scott sees the efforts at sedentarization of peoples as the state’s attempt to 
make society legible (the better to tax, conscript, and prevent rebellion), and “legibility as 
a central problem in statecraft” (Scott 1998, 2). These efforts, instead of incorporating the 
Navajo into the United States citizenry, have imposed conditions on Navajo sovereignty 
which, while attempting to make Diné society legible, have also effectively produced 
“Third World” conditions on the reservation, a phenomenon of internal colonization 
which political ecologists like Schroder et al. (2006) are beginning to recognize. 
 In effect, the process of bounding the Diné allowed the federal government and its 
corporate ‘cronies’ to maintain control over the reservation lands and use them for natural 
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resource extraction. The resource wealth of the Navajo and Hopi tribes are therefore not 
reflected in their economies, but instead contributes to the development of American 
cities such as Phoenix and Tucson. Because native territory disproportionately bears the 
burden of environmental destruction, the original source of the destruction becomes 
dissociated and externalized (“out of sight out of mind”). Thus, it is the improvement of 
the standard of living for a few that is responsible for the impoverishment of the many. 
However, because of the entangled nature of the social and the natural, that which 
destroys the natural also destroys the social.  
 The environmental racism literature puts forth that disproportionate exposure of 
minority groups to pollution is largely due to the spatialization of race: the ways in which 
white privilege acts as an unconscious, spatial process of organization to locate 
environmental hazards (the product of capitalist expansion) in proximity to minority 
groups (Pulido 2000). But Native Americans have a unique situation from other minority 
groups because direct, violent force dictated the location of reservations (Hooks and 
Smith 2004, 562). Hooks and Smith (2004) introduce the concept of the “treadmill of 
destruction,” which implies that the by-products of capitalist expansion via consumption 
of natural resources and deposition of toxic waste has not only an unconscious, 
systematic racial dimension but also an intentional and coercive one.  
 The confinement of Native Americans to reservations was a method of controlling 
and subduing Native peoples, and constituted a major change in the landscape as many 
thousands of people were relocated to restricted, barren lands. In addition to several 
Native American reservations, the landscape of the Grand Canyon region contains 
national monuments, forests, wilderness areas and parks—all technically federal lands. 
 
	   52	  
Thus, power-infused territorial processes created on the one hand spaces of national 
nature, of sublime wilderness, and on the other spaces of national sacrifice. These spaces 
are both highly racialized; “nature” in federally protected reserves such as the Grand 
Canyon are produced as white or Anglo spaces, while the reservations are produced as 
Native spaces. Racialized visitation patterns to national parks are a testament to this: as of 
1999, 91% of park visitors, on average, were white (Littlejohn, National Park Service, 
personal communication 1998 and Floyd 1999 in Erikson, Johnson and Kivel 2009, 529). 
The bordering of both nature and Native America actively produce this racial 
polarization, and the national park has come to facilitate the tokenization and 
consumption of several Native cultures in the Grand Canyon region.  
 But because of the abstract and somewhat arbitrary nature of political borders, it 
is important to acknowledge the interlinked and processual, constructed nature of these 
seemingly separate territories (between Page, the Navajo Reservation, and wilderness 
areas such as the Grand Canyon). In other words, territoriality is a social, political, 
economic, cultural process, and “territorial configurations are not simply cultural 
artifacts, but political achievements” (Delaney 2005, 12). Barbara Morehouse, in her 
book A Place Called Grand Canyon, examines the greater Grand Canyon region as a 
“mosaic of spaces that represent different kinds of knowledge, different values, different 
goals,” in which territorial boundaries are dynamic and changing (1996, 3). And while 
she conveys that the boundaries between the five Native American reservations, Grand 
Canyon National Park and other lands managed by federal land management agencies 
and the states of Arizona and Utah are reflective of power relationships in the region, she 
bases her analysis on the assumption that society’s organization of geographical space 
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and the use of boundaries to delineate the edges or limits to those spaces is an ancient and 
fundamental process of human existence (Morehouse 1996, 6). Morehouse places her 
faith in the nation-state system of territorial bounding and argues that, in the context of 
“our contemporary national (and global) political and economic systems,” the nation-
state system is the “best one available,” despite its “failure to permanently resolve 
disputes over territory and resources” (2012, 7). But this “ancient and fundamental 
process of human existence,” has a specific historical origin and lineage: namely, 
colonialism.  
 The reservationization of the Navajo is a case in point. The process of territorial 
bounding of the Diné has produced much more violence than it has ameliorated. 
Reservationization, rather than ‘freeing’ the Diné or paving the path to self-
determination, has internally colonized the tribe. Over hundreds and thousands of years 
before Euro-American contact, Native Americans and their tribal governments had 
developed sustainable economic and property rights regimes, but today Native Americans 
and Native American communities are “mired in poverty and do not possess functioning 
economies” (Miller 2012, 3). Miller states that the “obvious” reason that tribal 
governments and communities have gone from being “relatively prosperous” and 
controlling most of the land and assets of the continental United States to today being 
impoverished is that “this was the express intention of Euro-American colonists and 
political leaders” (Miller 2012, 25).  
 Today, the maintenance of poverty on Native American reservations is cloaked by 
more diffuse forms of power. Dependency theory, which focuses on relations between 
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countries in the global South and North,23 speaks to the mechanism though which the 
impoverishment of Native peoples has occurred. A theory originating in Latin America, it 
seeks to explain the economic situation of modern-day indigenous peoples, suggesting 
that resources flow from states in the “periphery” to those in the “core,” accumulating 
wealth and capital in the latter at the expense of the former (Miller 2012, 27). Critiques of 
this theory focus on the universal assumptions it makes about the relationship between 
capitalism and Native American culture, and the high level of abstraction it operates 
within where individual actors are subsumed by the workings of larger structures, making 
Native Americans appear as “pawns” to outside forces and stripping Native American 
people of their agency (Miller 2012, 29). But rather than focusing on how agency is lost 
within the rigid and dominating frameworks of oppressive structures, it is a small 
conceptual leap to instead focus on the ways in which Native bodies and communities are 
constantly navigating, negotiating, and resisting these deeply-rooted structures at the 
everyday level.  
 On the Navajo reservation, “nature” is a resource, something to be commodified, 
exploited. Next door, at the Grand Canyon “nature” is something entirely different—
something sublime, to be revered, protected, seen and visited. The Grand Canyon and the 
Navajo Reservation represent different forms of nature, alternate incarnations of 
socionature. Both landscapes are constructed, shaped and consumed, albeit in very 
different ways. But “[t]ry to reduce, limit, pollute, alter, or transform the Grand Canyon, 
and environmentalists from California to Maine react as the nation did after Pearl 
Harbor” (Keller and Turek 1998, 131). On the reservation, however, natural resource 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  As Schroeder, Martin and Albert (2006) point out, countries of the global South, or the “Third World,” 
are not always peripheral, geographically outside of “First World” countries of the global North, but are 
also found within the spatial heart of capitalism.	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industries are embedded within the socionatural landscape, with the Navajo Generating 
Station (one of seven coal plants in Dinétah), the Black Mesa coal mines and eleven other 
industries as the mechanisms of degradation which are currently carrying out the 
destruction of Native America (Smith 2007). They provide amenities to faraway places 
like Phoenix, Tucson and parts of Nevada and California at the expense of the Navajo 
people living with the industries themselves at the everyday level. Through the creation 
of national sacrifice areas, advanced industrial technologies (the NGS, for example) 
continue to siphon the wealth and resources of Native America, moving the wealth 
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Chapter 5 
Towards a Politics of Nature, Difference, and a More Equitable Energy Future 
 In the last decade the NGS has been on the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
radar. On July 28th, 2014 the EPA released a statement regarding the “final action” it is 
taking to clean up the NGS: the action implements the regional haze rule BART (Best 
Available Retrofit Technology), under the Clean Air Act, which requires that the operator 
of the NGS take steps to reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by either closing down one of 
its three units or by curtailing its electricity generation by a similar amount by 2019, and 
to meet a NOx emission limit that is achievable with the installation of selective catalytic 
reduction (SCR) on two units in 2030 (U.S. EPA 2014). According to the EPA, the 
nitrogen oxides are currently impacting the visibility at 11 national parks and wilderness 
areas (which are “mandatory Class I Federal areas”) (U.S. EPA 2014)24. In the statement, 
the EPA references visibility as crucial to healthy tourism and the economic vitality of 
the states as well as local and tribal communities in the West (U.S. EPA 2014).  
 While the haze issue has received much attention from environmental groups, 
cleaning up and eventually, closing down the Navajo Generating Station remains a very 
complex issue. Hada Asidi, an independent organization of Navajo grassroots and former 
Navajo Nation leaders, released a statement in 2012 in the Navajo Times with respect to 
calls from the Grand Canyon Trust and Sierra Club to close down the NGS (Bluehouse et 
al. 2012). Hada Asidi stresses that while cleaner energy is a necessity of the future, many 
things need to be in place before the plant can close down: the Navajo economy and 
Navajo livelihoods are wrapped up in this facility. While it pollutes the air with toxic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  See map showing the Class I Areas near FCPP (Four Corners Power Plant) and NGS modelled for 
Regional Haze Rule BART, Figure 7, in Appendix A.	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chemicals, and the extraction of coal from Black Mesa causes many environmental and 
social problems for the Navajo, the industry and the plant employ many Navajos and 
financially sustains a significant portion of the Navajo government. According to Hana 
Asidi, “if NGS were to shut down then Peabody shuts down. Then the Navajo Nation 
government will partially close. Some or most of the chapters will be affected as well. So 
it won't be just NGS that will shut down, there will be a major domino effect” (Bluehouse 
et al. 2012). Thus, in order to take action on the NGS, alternative energy sources must 
first be thoroughly planned and budgeted and personnel must be trained (ibid).  
 While the Navajo Generating Station and other coal plants on the reservation 
release toxic air pollutants, contributing to health issues, ozone and fine particle 
pollution, guzzle water in a desert region where community and individual access to 
water is already severely challenged, and depend on continued mining operations which 
have displaced thousands of Navajos and have severe environmental consequences, the 
NGS also helps finance the Navajo Tribal Council and employ many Navajo people 
living in Page. Thus, the relationship between the NGS and the Navajo Nation is complex 
and interdependent. Though many Diné citizens and non-Diné environmentalists wish to 
clean up the plant or eliminate it altogether, it is important to understand the social 
(including the historic, political and economic) factors which developed the 
Reservation’s coal industry, helping to create the NGS.   
 I have traced some of the historical-geographical origins of the coal industry on 
the Navajo Nation, and specifically of the structure of the Navajo Generating Station 
through various material, natural, and spatially-embedded linkages, starting with water. 
The politics of water that dictate Arizonan’s behaviors around water and understandings 
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of water have facilitated the creation of the NGS (as an alternative to the Grand Canyon 
Dams), and maintain the NGS as a source of electrical power for further infrastructural 
systems (the CAP) that conduct and divert water across the landscape of Arizona. The 
networks of distribution, flows and power which the NGS connects between power lines, 
water canals, cities, coal mines, man-made lakes, and so forth are embedded within 
relationships of power and difference, and function as a system to remove resources from 
the Navajo and deliver them to urban dwellers across the desert.  
 The material meanings and manifestations of the Navajo Generating Station in the 
landscape of Page, the Navajo Nation, and the Grand Canyon deserve much deeper 
attention than I could give them in this thesis. But through beginning to trace the power 
plant’s linkages to water, Manson Mesa (what Page was before it became Page), the 
surrounding skies into which it emits highly mobile particulates and toxins, to a collective 
memory of dispossession and violent control over ancestral bodies, contemporary bodies, 
and perhaps future Navajo bodies, I have suggested that the plant plays a much more 
complex role in the environment of Northern Arizona than American wilderness 
preservationist rhetoric can portray, and that the scope of the current environmentalist 
discourse (the National Parks Service and the Sierra Club versions of it, at least) is deeply 
lacking. 
 I have brought up the need to interrogate how we think about ‘nature’ as separate 
from society. To expand on this: there is a need to place ourselves (as human subjects) 
back within nature—to complicate and re-entangle this relationship. This means 
understanding animate and inanimate environments—landscapes, bodies, water in its 
infinite flows and formations, soils, biota—as subjects taking part in a collective 
 
	   59	  
performance of agency and also seeing our human selves as subjected, and as participants 
in this “collective performance” that is nature (Sundberg 2010, 332). Furthermore, in this 
reimagined nature in which “boundaries between subjects and objects are broken…the 
past and sometimes the future occupy the present” (Kosek 2006, 259). By implicating 
ourselves, and our histories (both known histories and unknown, omitted histories) within 
the lived material landscape, we can arrive at politicised, historicized, material geography 
from which we can approach nature and environmentalism. This means paying close 
attention to the politics of difference and the social reproduction of difference, which are 
thoroughly embedded and located in the landscape, from the perspective of a politics of 
nature. An environmentalism that focuses on conservation and the preservation of 
pristine, unpopulated wildernesses is wildly insufficient because it does not address the 
fundamental problem of the current environmental struggle: the ideological separation 
between what constitutes “nature” and what constitutes “society.”  
 I came to this project in an attempt to better understand why for some, certain 
spaces are valued (as “nature”) over others, and to investigate the disconnect between the 
discourse of conservation (which is dominated by the white upper class) and the everyday 
actions of those who practice/produce this discourse. This is evidenced by the different 
ways in which we consume and produce “nature” and conceive of spaces such as the 
Grand Canyon and the Navajo Nation as separate and distinct forms of nature that serve 
different capitalist functions. Turner argues that wilderness tourism, an “aesthetic 
campaign to preserve the wild,” or pristine nature, “has done as much harm as good” 
(1991, 336). Wilderness tourism is invested in preserving a de-peopled nature created via 
the violent removal and dispossession of Native peoples—and by continuing to ignore 
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this history of dispossession, the colonial violence only deepens. Furthermore, the notion 
that wilderness exists in opposition to society, as places of refuge from society to which 
we may always return, serves to justify the exploitation of the spaces we live in, allowing 
us to “give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives we actually lead” 
(Cronon, 26). In many ways, this thesis (and those individuals and authors who have 
provided me with intellectual and emotional guidance on how to tackle the messy, 
tangled-up and maddening contradictions of the world) have set me on my path to 
becoming a “recovering environmentalist” (Kosek 2006, 180). It has opened the door into 
a more critical political ecology which has the potential to, to borrow from Kosek, 
“cultivate an awareness” of highly politicized, nationalized and racialized natures, “draw 
out the hidden labors and constitutive silences implicit in the making of wilderness,” and 
reconceptualize nature (181). 
 Struggles over water and nature in the Southwest, the Grand Canyon Dam 
controversy, the construction of the spatialities of Page, and the bounding of the Navajo 
(and relatedly, the bounding of nature) all contributed to the siting of the NGS just 
outside Page on the Navajo Reservation. By examining structures of power intersecting at 
the Navajo Generating Station and the ways in which they are contested and reproduced 
in space, we can begin to understand the relationship between nature, space and 
coloniality. In the same way that structures of racism organize space and bestow power in 
ways that privileges whiteness, colonialism organizes space in a way that privileges some 
forms of socionature over others. As Light Carruyo points out, there exists a “messy 
reality of a wealth of competing logics and practices, dynamically constituted and in 
dialogue with structural forces” within hierarchies of power over space and nature 
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(Carruyo 2008, 107). This is evident in the many attitudes towards the NGS. Some see it 
as an economic asset for the Navajo Nation, some as an economic liability, some as an 
environmental catastrophe—either a threat to the Grand Canyon, a pristine natural space, 
or a threat to the health and livelihoods of the Diné people and the socionatural 
communities it affects. 
 While I allude to these diverse attitudes, my discussion lacks a real exploration of 
these attitudes, positions, stories and voices. Relying heavily on the literature, as I have 
done, as well as legislative documents and leases, does little to tell the story from a 
people’s perspective. A wealth of knowledge stands to be gained from interviews and 
from a more in-depth study of Navajo grassroots environmental and humanitarian 
organizations. Many of these organizations, such as Forgotten People, Save the 
Confluence, the Black Mesa Water Coalition, Diné CARE, the Just Transition Coalition 
and the collective Diné Water Rights Committee are working towards a healthier, more 
independent Navajo nation and a more equitable energy future. These are the voices that 
challenge the ideological separation between nature and society and assert the agency 
Navajo land and livelihoods on an everyday basis. There is a need to turn a critical eye to 
nationalistic environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, state agencies like the 
Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation, and to look to the individuals 
and organizations who deal with the everyday reality of colonial policies to guide action 
and activism (those who are not on the receiving end of economic, cultural/racial, or 
political power).  
 This does not have to start on the Navajo reservation. In fact, those areas of the 
so-called “core” are the areas which need to do the most work to expose the tensions held 
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within everyday actions (in things as mundane as mowing the lawn or driving to work). 
How are such daily practices—and this includes activities in “nature”—political; what 
are their material histories, their lineages? As Robbins (2012, 133) so eloquently 
articulates, “It is not enough to worry about what we do, or even why we do it, but rather 
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Figure	  4:	  Navajo	  Generating	  Station:	  Arizon'a	  Dirtiest	  Coal	  Plant	  (Sierra	  Club) 
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Figure	  5:	  Page,	  Arizona	  during	  dam	  construction	  (Powell	  Museum	  2015) 
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Figure	  6	  Colorado	  River	  Compact	  1922	  (usbr.gov) 
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Figure	  7:	  Arizona	  v.	  California,	  373	  US	  546,	  (1963) 
 
 
 
 
 
